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Abstract
We develop a two-period, three-class of income model where low-income agents
are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where re-
distributive expenditure is nanced by tax and government debt. When the degree
of capital market imperfection is high, there is an ends-against-the-middle equilib-
rium where the constrained low-income and the unconstrained high-income agents
favor low levels of government debt and redistributive expenditure; these agents
form a coalition against the middle. In this equilibrium, the levels of government
debt and expenditure might be below the ecient levels, and the spread of income
distribution results in a lower debt-to-GDP ratio.
Keywords: Government debt; Borrowing constraints; Voting; Structure-induced
equilibrium; Income inequality.
JEL Classication: D72, H52, H60.
Corresponding author. Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University, Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku,
Nagoya, Aichi, 464-8601 Japan. Email: arawatari@soec.nagoya-u.ac.jp
yGraduate School of Economics, Osaka University, 1-7, Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043,
Japan. Email: tono@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp
1 Introduction
The conventional wisdom is that a higher inequality of income results in a larger redis-
tributive public expenditure and that it results in a greater issue of government debt that
nances redistribution. This theoretical prediction builds on a median-voter framework,
in which a higher level of inequality translates into a poorer decisive agent in the political
arena, who will then demand more redistribution (Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer
and Richard, 1981; Krusell and Rios-Rull, 1999) and, thus, more government debt issue
for nancing redistribution (Cukierman and Meltzer, 1989).
The empirical evidence, however, does not necessarily support the above-mentioned
theoretical predictions. OECD cross-country data show that the volume of redistribution
is negatively correlated with income inequality (for example, Gottschalk and Smeeding,
1997; Chen and Song, 2009). The theoretical prediction of inequality and government
debt is also controversial. For instance, Belgium, France and Germany, located in the
Continental Europe, show low Gini coecients and high debt-to-GDP ratios, whereas the
United Kingdom and the United States, included in the Anglo-Saxon group, show high
Gini coecients and low debt-to-GDP ratios.1 A negative correlation between inequality
and debt-to-GDP ratio is observed for some OECD countries. This indicates that the
relationship between inequality and the size of government is not as simple as the standard
theory might expect.
Several theories have been provided to make sense of the above-mentioned puzzles.
Examples include political bias toward the rich (Benabou, 2000), the prospect of upward
mobility by low-income agents (Quadrini, 1999; Benabou and Ok, 2001; Alesina and La
Ferrara, 2005; Arawatari and Ono, 2009), lobbying and campaign contributions by the
rich (Rodriguez, 2004; Campante, 2010), voters' preferences for redistribution (Creedy
and Moslehi, 2009; Creedy, Li and Moslehi, 2010), and borrowing constraints that hit
low-income agents (Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau, 2000; Bellettini and Berti Ceroni,
2007; Cremer et al., 2007). These studies, however, assume that redistributive expenditure
is nanced only via income tax. In other words, they abstract away government debt as an
additional option for nancing redistributive expenditure even though government debt
is one of the major sources of government revenue in OECD countries.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the relationship between inequality and the
size of government debt when voting results in a negative correlation between inequality
and redistributive expenditure. In particular, we focus on the role of borrowing constraints
1Gini coecients in Belgium, France and Germany in the mid-2000s were 0.271, 0.270 and 0.298,
respectively; debt-to-GDP ratios in those countries in 2005 were 0.957, 0.760 and 0.711, respectively. In
contrast, Gini coecients in the United Kingdom and the United States in the mid-2000s were 0.335 and
0.381, respectively; debt-to-GDP ratios in these countries in 2005 were 0.461 and 0.623, respectively. The
source of the Gini coecients is OECD (2008), and the source of the debt-to-GDP ratio is OECD (2009).
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(or, equivalently, capital market imperfection) as a source of the negative correlation, and
examine how politically determined government debt and expenditure are aected by the
degree of capital market imperfection. In addition, we consider the spread of income
distribution and examine its impact on the debt-to-GDP ratio in relation to the degree
of capital market imperfection.
For the purpose of analysis, we utilize the two-period, three-class of income model of
Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (2007). In their framework, redistributive expenditures, such
as publicly provided education and investment in infrastructure such as schools, libraries
and research institutes are nanced through the rst-period income tax; the expenditures
improve the productivity of all agents in the second period. We introduce government
debt as an additional policy option for nancing redistributive expenditure into their
framework. That is, the redistributive expenditure is nanced by the rst-period income
tax as well as by government debt issue. The debt repayment is nanced by the second-
period income tax.
Under this extended framework, voters cast a ballot over the rst-period income tax,
and also over government debt issue. Under this type of voting game, the existence of a
Condorcet winner of the majority voting game is not necessarily guaranteed because of
the multidimensionality of the issue space (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini, 2000,
Chapter 2). To deal with this problem, we utilize the concept of a structure-induced
equilibrium (Shepsle, 1979). We determine the decisive voter over one issue given the
other issue and derive his/her reaction function for each policy issue. We then nd the
point where the two reaction functions cross; this point corresponds to the structure-
induced outcome of the majority voting game.
Our model demonstrates that voting over policy produces two opposing eects on
agents via the government expenditure: a negative eect that results in a greater tax
burden for nancing expenditure and, thus, the utility loss today; and a positive eect
that results in an improvement of labor productivity in the second period and, thus, the
utility gain in the future. When agents are borrowing unconstrained, they prefer a higher
level of government expenditure and, thus, a higher rst-period tax and government debt
as their rst-period income becomes lower. Because of the borrowing, unconstrained
agents can reallocate resources freely from the second period to the rst period, and they
can compensate the utility loss today by the utility gain tomorrow. Therefore, they want
to increase government expenditure in order to get the benet of the second-period labor
productivity improvement.
However, the opposite result holds when agents are borrowing constrained. Borrowing-
constrained agents prefer lower government debt and expenditure as their rst-period
income becomes lower. Borrowing-constrained agents are unable to reallocate resources
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freely from the second period to the rst period. Because of this constraint, the utility
gain from government expenditure in the future is valued less than the utility loss from
government expenditure today for the borrowing-constrained agents. Therefore, they
prefer less government expenditure and, thus, lower rst-period income tax and debt as
their rst-period income becomes lower.
Given the above-mentioned feature of the model, we obtain the following three results.
First, the type of decisive voter depends on the degree of capital market imperfection. The
decisive voter is the middle-income, borrowing-unconstrained agent when the degree of
capital market imperfection is low. However, the decisive voter becomes the low-income,
borrowing-constrained agent when the degree is high. That is, the economy displays the
ends-against-the-middle equilibrium, as in Epple and Romano (1996), where the high-
and low-income agents, who favor low government expenditure and debt, form a coalition
against the middle who favor high government expenditure and debt.
The second result is that the political equilibrium generally fails to attain the ecient
allocation. That is, rst-period tax, government debt and expenditure in the political
equilibrium are higher or lower than the ecient levels depending on either the income
level of a decisive voter or the degree of capital market imperfection. In particular, under
a certain condition, there exists a critical level of capital market imperfection such that
the political equilibrium levels of rst-period tax, government debt and expenditure are
lower than the ecient levels when the degree of capital market imperfection is above the
critical level. This result implies that countries with less access to capital markets are
more likely to attain lower levels of rst-period tax, government debt and expenditure
than the ecient levels.
The third result is that the eect of income distribution on the debt-to-GDP ratio
depends on the degree of capital market imperfection. In particular, there exists a critical
level of capital market imperfection, which is dierent from that described in the last
paragraph, such that the income distribution results in a higher debt-to-GDP ratio when
the degree of capital market imperfection is below the critical level, and the standard
result a la Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) holds. However, when the degree is above the
critical level, the opposite result holds because the decisive voter, who is a borrowing-
constrained low-income agent, wants to choose lower government expenditure and debt.
That is, there is a negative correlation between inequality and debt-to-GDP ratio when
the degree of capital market imperfection is high.
Our analysis and results contribute to the following three strands of literature. The
rst strand is the literature on inequality and redistribution in the presence of borrow-
ing constraints. Examples are Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (2000), Bellettini and
Berti Ceroni (2007), Cremer et al. (2007) and Arawatari and Ono (2011). These stud-
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ies demonstrate that the decisive voter prefers a lower income tax as his/her income is
decreased when he/she is borrowing constrained. Thus, they clarify the role of borrow-
ing constraint in presenting the negative correlation between inequality and the preferred
tax for redistribution. However, government debt is abstracted away in these studies.
The current paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating how the politically de-
termined size of government debt is aected by income distribution in the presence of
borrowing constraints.
The second strand is the literature on tax smoothing and government debt (for exam-
ple, Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Aiyagari et al., 2002). Our model demonstrates
that, in an ecient allocation, the tax rates should be equal between two periods, and
the size of government debt is adjusted to smooth tax rates across periods. However,
the model demonstrates that, in political equilibrium, the rst-period tax rate becomes
lower or higher than the ecient rate depending on either the income level of a decisive
voter or the degree of capital market imperfection. The result suggests that the presence
of borrowing constraint might prevent the realization of tax smoothing in the political
economy.
The third strand is the literature on the politics of government debt. Although there
are many studies that consider how the size of government debt is determined via politics,
most of them abstract away the role of income inequality among voters in the determina-
tion of government debt. Previous studies instead have focused on the roles of common
pool problems (for example, Tabellini, 1986; Velasco, 1999), political instability (for ex-
ample, Persson and Svensson, 1989; Aghion and Bolton, 1990; Alesina and Tabellini,
1990; Tabellini and Alesina, 1990), altruistic and selsh agents (de Walque and Gevers,
2001) and intergenerational conict (for example, Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2012).
An exception is the study of Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), which demonstrates the
positive correlation between inequality and government debt: a higher level of inequality
results in a greater issue of government debt. However, as mentioned above, empirical
evidence suggests that the relationship is not so straightforward: some countries are
featured by low inequality and high debt-to-GDP ratio, whereas others are characterized
by high inequality and low debt-to-GDP ratio. The current paper demonstrates that
there is a negative correlation between inequality and debt-to-GDP ratio when the degree
of capital market imperfection is high. The result could provide one possible explanation
for the empirical evidence among some OECD countries.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 characterizes political equilibrium. Section 4 compares the political equilibrium with
the ecient allocation. Section 5 examines the eect of income inequality on the debt-to-
GDP ratio. Section 6 provides concluding remarks. Proofs of Propositions are given in
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the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a small open economy model that is based on Bellettini and Berti Ceroni
(2007). Agents live in two periods; they are indexed by their rst-period labor productivity
ei1, which is also equal to their income. They belong to three income classes (low, middle
and high classes) in terms of their rst-period labor productivity, denoted by ei1(i =
l;m; h) : el1 < e
m
1 < e
h
1 . The fraction of people in each class is given by 
i with i 2 (0; 0:5)
and
P
i2fl;m;hg 
i = 1. The average rst-period income, E1 
P
i2fl;m;hg 
iei1, which is
equal to aggregate labor income, is assumed to satisfy em1 < E1 < e
h
1 ; the distribution of
the rst-period income is right-skewed.
In their rst period of life, agents allocate their labor income between consumption
and saving. Because of the assumption of a small open economy, the aggregate return on
saving is exogenous and equal to R(> 1). Following De Gregorio (1996) and Bellettini
and Berti Ceroni (2007), we assume that, in the rst period, agents cannot borrow more
than    1 times their after-tax income to nance current consumption. When  = 1,
agents cannot borrow at all; when  ! +1, agents can borrow as much as they want.
Therefore, the index  2 [1;+1) represents the degree of capital market imperfection.
A lower  implies a higher degree of capital market imperfection.
Preferences are specied by the following intertemporal utility function:
U i = log ci1 +  log c
i
2;
where ci1 and c
i
2 represent consumption of a type- i agent in periods 1 and 2, respectively,
and  2 (0; 1) denotes the discount factor. We employ the above-mentioned specication
for the tractability of analysis. The role of this assumption will be discussed later.
Labor income in the second period is equal to his/her labor productivity in that period.
Following Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (2007), we assume that a type-i's productivity in
the second period, dened by ei2, depends on the public expenditure in the rst period. In
particular, we assume ei2 = A(e
i
1)
G, where A(> 0) is an exogenous parameter,  2 (0; 1)
is a coecient of labor productivity depreciation and G is public expenditure in the
rst period. The expenditure G increases the productivity of labor of all agents in the
second period. Examples of the public expenditure are publicly nanced education and
public investment in infrastructure such as schools, universities, research institutions and
libraries.
The public expenditure in the rst period is nanced through linear income taxation
and government debt issue. We assume convex costs of collecting taxes in order to avoid
corner solutions for the endogenous tax rate. In particular, if t is the tax rate in the tth
5
period, the actual tax revenue in that period is t(1  t)Et, where Et 
P
i2fl;m;hg 
ieit is
the aggregate labor income (i.e., GDP) in the tth period.2
The government budget constraints in the rst and the second periods, respectively,
are given by:
G = 1(1  1)E1 +B; (1)
RB = 2(1  2)E2; (2)
where B denotes government debt issue. In the rst period, the revenue from tax and
debt issue is used for public expenditure G. In the second period, government debt is
paid o by the second-period tax revenue. We assume that the government is not allowed
to default.
3 The Political Equilibrium
At the beginning of period 1, each agent votes over 1 and B to maximize his/her in-
direct utility subject to the government budget constraints. The corresponding level of
government expenditure is determined via the rst-period government budget constraint
(1). After that, given policies, each agent chooses consumption ci1 and c
i
2 to maximize
his/her utility subject to individual budget constraints. At the beginning of period 2, the
government imposes the tax 2 to nance the repayment of government debt.
The tax revenue in the second period is solely used to nance debt repayment. This
implies that setting B is equivalent to setting 2. Given this property, we hereafter focus on
the political determination of 1 and 2, rather than 1 and B, and consider the following
two-stage maximization problem. In the rst stage, agents vote over policies to maximize
their indirect utility subject to the government budget constraints (1) and (2). In the
second stage, given policies, agents choose consumption to maximize their utility subject
to individual budget constraints.
In what follows, we induce the political equilibrium by backward induction. First, we
solve the utility maximization problems of agents (Subsection 3.1). Then, we dene the
political institution and describe policy preferences of agents (Subsection 3.2). Finally,
we characterize political equilibrium of the voting game (Subsection 3.3).
2The assumption of convex costs could be viewed as the reduced form of distortion in the labor market
produced by labor{leisure choice (see, for example, Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau, 2000; Bellettini and
Berti Ceroni, 2007; Cremer et al., 2007). The assumption of distortionary taxation is solely to ensure an
interior solution to preferred tax rates and otherwise plays no role.
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3.1 Economic Decisions
The utility maximization problem of a type-i agent is as follows:
max
ci1;c
i
2
U i = log ci1 +  log c
i
2;
s.t. ci1 = (1  1)ei1   si;
ci2 = (1  2)ei2 +Rsi;
si  (1   )(1  1)ei1; (3)
where si denotes the saving of a type-i agent. The rst and the second constraints are
individual i's budget constraints in the rst and the second periods, respectively. The
third constraint is the borrowing constraint.
In order to solve the problem, suppose rst that the borrowing constraint is not bind-
ing. The solution to the utility maximization problem yields:
ciu1 =
1
1 + 


(1  1)ei1 +
(1  2)ei2
R

; (4)
ciu2 =
R
1 + 


(1  1)ei1 +
(1  2)ei2
R

; (5)
siu =

1 + 
(1  1)ei1  
1
(1 + )R
(1  2)ei2; (6)
where the superscript u denotes \unconstrained".
We substitute the saving function into the borrowing constraint (3) to obtain the
condition where a type-i agent is actually unconstrained in terms of the tax rates 1 and
2:
R f(1 + )   1g > (1  2)e
i
2
(1  1)ei1
: (7)
This condition states that the borrowing constraint of a type-i agent does not bind when
his/her after-tax income is high in the rst period and is low in the second period.
Alternatively, suppose that the borrowing constraint is binding; that is, (7) fails to
hold. The solution to the utility maximization problem yields:
cic1 =  (1  1)ei1; (8)
cic2 = R(1   )(1  1)ei1 + (1  2)ei2 = R 

(1   )(1  1)ei1 +
(1  2)ei2
R

; (9)
sic = (1   )(1  1)ei1; (10)
where the superscript c denotes \constrained".
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3.2 Policy Preferences, the Political Institution and Voting
In the voting stage, agents vote over policies to maximize their indirect utility. In order
to set up this maximization problem, we rst derive the indirect utility functions in terms
of tax rates. For this purpose, we substitute the consumption functions derived in the
previous subsection into the utility function U i and obtain the following:
U i =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
log

1
1+
 [(1  1)ei1 + (1  2)ei2=R]

+   log

R
1+
 [(1  1)ei1 + (1  2)ei2=R]

if R f(1 + )   1g > (1 2)ei2
(1 1)ei1
;
log ( (1  1)ei1)
+  log [(1  2)ei2 +R(1   )(1  1)ei1] if R f(1 + )   1g  (1 2)e
i
2
(1 1)ei1
:
The productivity in the second stage, ei2, depends on the government expenditure G
and, thus, on the tax rates 1 and 2. In order to write e
i
2 as a function of 1 and 2, we
dene: eE1  AX
i
i(ei1)

and rewrite E2 as a function of eE1 :
E2 
X
i
iei2 = G eE1:
The variable eE1 shows the marginal eect of public expenditure G on the second-period
GDP, denoted by E2.
We utilize eE1  APi i(ei1) and E2 = G eE1 to rewrite two government budget
constraints (1) and (2) as follows:
G =
1(1  1)E1
1  22(1  2) ; (11)
B = 22(1  2)  1(1  1)E1
1  22(1  2) ; (12)
where
 
qeE1=R:
We impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1:  2 (1; 2):
The inequality condition of 1 <  ensures that the tax rate in the second period is
set within the range (0; 1=2) in equilibrium. Given  2 (0; 1=2); the term appeared in
(11) and (12) is positive as long as  < 2. Therefore, the condition of  < 2 ensures that
B > 0 and G > 0 hold in equilibrium; otherwise the economy experiences (a) international
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lending of assets rather than borrowing and (b) no government expenditure, both of which
are not considered in this paper. The inequality condition of  < 2 also guarantees the
single-peakedness of preferences over 1 and 2. These roles of Assumption 1 are found in
the following analysis.
By the use of (11), we can present the lifetime income of a type-i agent as a function
of tax rates:
(1  1)ei1 +
(1  2)ei2
R
= (1  1)ei1 +
(1  2)
R
 A(ei1) 
1(1  1)E1
1  22(1  2) :
With the above-mentioned lifetime income, the indirect utility function of a type-i agent
becomes:
V i(1; 2) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
V iu    log (R)  (1 + )  log(1 + )
+ (1 + )  log
h
(1  1)ei1 + (1 2)R  A(ei1)  1(1 1)E11 22(1 2)
i
if R f(1 + )   1g > (1 2)ei2
(1 1)ei1
;
V ic  log ( ei1) + log(1  1) +   log(R)
+   log
h
(1   )(1  1)ei1 + (1 2)R  A(ei1)  1(1 1)E11 22(1 2)
i
if R f(1 + )   1g  (1 2)ei2
(1 1)ei1
:
(13)
The tax rates 1 and 2 are determined by individuals through a political process of
majoritarian voting. Because the issue space is bidimensional, the Nash equilibrium of a
majoritarian voting game may fail to exist. To deal with this feature, we use the concept
of issue-by-issue voting, or structure-induced equilibrium, as formalized by Shepsle (1979).
In particular, if preferences are single peaked for each policy issue, a sucient condition
for ( 1 ; 

2 ) to be an equilibrium of the voting game is that 

1 represents the outcome
of majority voting over 1 when the other dimension is xed at 

2 , and vice versa. In
Appendix A.1, it is shown that preferences are indeed single peaked along every dimension
of the issue space.
We can now solve the problem in the voting stage. A type-i agent chooses 1 to
maximize his/her indirect utility given 2; and he/she chooses 2 to maximize his/her
indirect utility given 1. The threshold level of capital market imperfection for a type-i
agent, denoted by  i, is derived by substituting his/her preferred pair of tax rates into
the condition (7). The following proposition states policy preferences of agents.
Proposition 1. The most preferred policy by a type-i agent satises:
( i1)
 =
(
 iu1  12   R(2 )2AE1  (ei1)1  < 12 if  >  i;
 ic1  1+2 + (1+)R(  1)(2 )(1+2)AE1  (ei1)1  if    i;
( i2)
 = 1  1

2

0;
1
2

8  1; 8i 2 fl;m; hg;
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(Gi) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
Giu  E1
4(2 )

1 

R(2 )
AE1
2
 (ei1)2(1 )

if  >  i;
Gic  E1
(2 )(1+2)2
h
(1 + ) + (1+)R(  1)(2 )
AE1
 (ei1)1 
 

(1+)R(  1)(2 )
AE1
2
 (ei1)2(1 )

if    i;
(Bi) =

Biu = (   1) Giu if  >  i;
Bic = (   1) Gic if    i; (14)
where  i is given by:
 i  1
2(1 + )
+
AE1
2R(1 + )(2  )  (e
i
1)
 1:
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
For each type of i, there is a threshold level of capital market imperfection, denoted by
 i. When the degree of imperfection is higher, such that    i, any agent belonging to
class i is borrowing constrained. The threshold level  i becomes higher as the productivity
in the rst period becomes lower:  l >  m >  h. That is, an agent belonging to a lower
class is more likely to be borrowing constrained.
The degree of capital market imperfection critically aects the preferences over policy.
In order to understand the role of capital market imperfection, we rst consider its impact
on the preference over the government expenditure nanced by the rst-period tax and
debt. On the one hand, raising the government expenditure decreases the utility today
through an increase in the rst-period tax burden. On the other hand, raising the govern-
ment expenditure, nanced by an increase in the rst-period tax and debt issue, increases
the utility in the future through an improvement in labor productivity. Therefore, the
most preferred rst-period tax and debt are determined to equate negative and positive
eects at a margin.
When a type-i agent is borrowing unconstrained, he/she can choose  i1 and B
i that
attain the maximum of utility. His/her preferences over  i1 and B
i follow the standard
result in the literature of the political economy of redistribution (Romer, 1975; Roberts,
1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Cukierman and Meltzer, 1989): a richer agent prefers
lower tax and debt issue. However, when he/she is borrowing constrained, he/she cannot
reallocate income freely from the second period to the rst period. Given this limitation,
the utility gain in the future is less valued than the utility loss today. Therefore, a
constrained agent prefers a lower level of government expenditure and, thus, lower rst-
period tax and debt as he/she becomes poorer.
Voters' preferences over the second-period tax rate are unaected by types and capi-
tal market imperfection. This property depends on the specication of the second-period
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productivity, ei2 = A(e
i
1)
G. The second-period productivity ei2 is linearly related to gov-
ernment expenditure G. This implies that maximizing V i with respect to  i2 is equivalent
to maximizing G with respect to  i2. Because G is unaected by types and capital market
imperfection, as shown in (11), the choice of  i2 is independent of them. This result also
holds true as long as preferences are characterized by a constant intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (see Appendix A.3).
The most preferred levels of government expenditure and public debt by a type-i agent
are derived by substituting ( i1)
 and ( i2)
 into the government budget constraints (11)
and (12). The preferred levels satisfy the following properties. First, (Gi) and (Bi) are
aected by the degree of capital market imperfection when a type-i agent is borrowing
constrained. Second, (Bi) is linearly related to (Gi) because (Bi) = ()22(1  2)(Gi)
holds from (11) and (12), and ( i2)
 is independent of the type of an agent and is simply
given by 1  1=.
The following corollary states how policy preferences of agents are aected by capital
market imperfection when agents are borrowing constrained.
Corollary 1
(i) @ ic1 =@ > 0, @G
ic=@ > 0, and @Bic=@ > 0.
(ii)  iu1 = 
ic
1 ; G
iu = Gic; and Biu = Bicat  =  i.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 illustrates how voters' preferences over policies (1, G, B) are aected by
the degree of capital market imperfection, denoted by  . When they are borrowing
unconstrained, their choice of 1, G and B is independent of capital market imperfection.
However, when they are borrowing constrained, their choice depends on the degree of
capital market imperfection. A lower  implies that they are more constrained. In order
to relax the constraint, they prefer a lower rst-period tax rate and, thus, prefer a lower
level of government expenditure.
3.3 Political Equilibrium
Based on the characterization of voting behavior of each type of an agent, we now consider
the determination of structure-induced equilibrium policies via majority voting. The
second-period tax rate is given by 2 = 1   1= because all types of agents prefer this
rate. Given 2 = 1   1=, the equilibrium rst-period tax rate is given by the most
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preferred 1 by the median voter. The equilibrium levels of government expenditure and
debt are then given by the preferred levels by the median voter over 1.
In order to determine the median voter over 1, we introduce the critical level of the
rst-period income, e1, dened by:
e1  [AE1=((1 + 2)R(2  ))] 11  :
Direct calculation leads to:
ei1 R e1 ,  i Q 1:
When the rst-period productivity of a type-i agent is high such that ei1 > e1,  i < 1
always holds for a type-i agent. In other words, he/she is borrowing unconstrained for
any degree of capital market imperfection of  2 [1;+1). He/she has enough income in
the rst period that is beyond the critical level e1 and, thus, can choose a combination of
consumption and saving that does not hit the borrowing constraint from the viewpoint
of utility maximization. In contrast, an agent might be borrowing constrained for a low
 if ei1  e1 holds. In order to reduce a set of possible political equilibria, we impose the
following assumption with respect to e1.
Assumption 2. el1 < e
m
1 < e1 < eh1 .
Assumption 2 ensures that type-h agents are never borrowing constrained. Therefore,
given the properties of preferred rst-period tax rate, demonstrated in Proposition 1 and
Corollary 1, the decisive voter will be a type-l or a type-m agent. The following proposition
determines the decisive voter, contingent on the degree of capital market imperfection.
Proposition 2 The decisive voter over 1 is a borrowing-constrained type-l agent if
 2 [1; b ]; and a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent if  2 ( b ;1) where:
b  AE1 +R(2  )  2(1 + )  (el1)1    (1 + 2)  (em1 )1 
2(1 + )R(2  )  (el1)1 
2 ( m;  l):
Political equilibrium policies, f 1 ;  2 ; G; Bg, are given by:
 1 =
(
 lc1 if  2 [1; b ]
mu1 if  2 ( b ;1) ;
 2 = 1 
1

8  1;
G =
(
Glc if  2 [1; b ]
Gmu if  2 ( b ;1) ;
B =
(
Blc if  2 [1; b ]
Bmu if  2 ( b ;1) :
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Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Figure 2 illustrates the political equilibrium policies  1 , G
 and B. As demonstrated
in the gure, the identity of the median voter depends on the degree of capital market
imperfection, denoted by  : a higher  means a lower degree of capital market imper-
fection. When an agent is less likely to be borrowing constrained, such that  > b , the
decisive voter becomes the type-m agent who is borrowing unconstrained. Their preferred
policies lie between those by type-l and type-h agents. However, when an agent is more
likely to be borrowing constrained, such that  < b , there is an ends-against-the-middle
equilibrium: the decisive voter is the borrowing-constrained, type-l agent. He/she prefers
a lower tax rate and, thus, lower levels of government expenditure and debt than the
type-m agent because of the strict nancial constraint. The policies preferred by the
borrowing-constrained type-l agent lie between those by type-m and type-h agents.
[Figure 2 about here.]
4 Welfare Implication
In this section, we evaluate the political equilibrium in terms of eciency. Following
Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (2007), we focus on the set of policy variables that maximize
the present discounted value (PDV) of aggregate disposable income. We compare it
with the political equilibrium policies and investigate under what condition the political
equilibrium results in an excess burden of tax and debt.
The PDV of aggregate disposable income, denoted by I, is given by:
I 
X
i2fl;m;hg
i(1  1)ei1 +
1
R
X
i2fl;m;hg
i(1  2)ei2;
that is,
I = (1  1)E1 + (1  2)A1(1  1)E1
R f1  ()22(1  2)g 
eE1:
The rst term on the right-hand side is the aggregate disposable income in the rst period,
and the second term is the present value of the aggregate disposable income in the second
period.
The rst-period tax rate 1 has two competing eects on PDV of aggregate disposable
income. An increase in 1 creates a negative eect via a decrease in the rst-period after-
tax income, and a positive eect via an increase in the government expenditure devoted
to education. A social planner chooses 1 to equate these two competing eects at a
margin. The second-period tax 2 also has two competing eects via the second-period
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after-tax income and government expenditure. The planner chooses 2 to equate these
two competing eects at a margin.
Let f e1 ;  e2g denote the ecient tax rates that maximize the PDV of aggregate dis-
posable income, and fGe; Beg denote the corresponding levels of government expenditure
and debt, respectively. The ecient tax rates  e1 and 
e
2 are derived by setting @I=@1 = 0
and @I=@2 = 0, respectively:
 e1 = 
e
2 = 1 
1

:
The planner chooses the same tax rates between the two periods in order to smooth tax
burdens over periods. The corresponding levels of government expenditure and debt are
calculated by substituting  e1 and 
e
2 into the government budget constraints:
Ge =
(   1)  E1
2(2  ) ; B
e =
(   1)2  E1
2(2  ) = (   1) G
e:
A noteworthy feature is that the second-period tax rate in the political equilibrium
is ecient:  e2 = 

2 . In order to understand the mechanism behind this result, we focus
on the term related to 2. In the political equilibrium, the decisive voter j chooses 2 to
maximize his/her second-period after-tax income, given by:
(1  2)A(ei1)G = (1  2)A(ei1):
1(1  1)E1
1  22(1  2) :
In contrast, in the ecient allocation, the planner chooses 2 to maximize the aggregate
second-period after-tax income given by:X
i2fl;m;hg
i(1  2)A(ei1)G =
X
i2fl;m;hg
i(1  2)A(ei1):
1(1  1)E1
1  22(1  2)
The objective functions are dierent between the two problems. However, the terms
related to 2 are equivalent between the two problems; both are given by (1   2)=f1  
22(1   2)g. This is because the government expenditure G, given in (1), enters into
these two objective functions in a linear fashion. Therefore, we can obtain the ecient
second-period tax rate in the political equilibrium.
The eciency generally fails to hold as regards 1, G and B: The following proposition
demonstrates the conditions for which the political equilibrium levels of 1, G and B are
higher or lower than the ecient levels.
Proposition 3.
(i) Suppose that em1 >

AE1
R2
 1
1 
holds. Then,
 e1 > 

1 ; G
e > G; Be > B; 8  1:
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(ii) Suppose that  < 1+2
1+
holds. Then,
 e1   1 ; Ge  G; Be  B; 8  1:
(iii) Suppose that em1 

AE1
R2
 1
1 
and   1+2
1+
hold. Then,
 e1 > 

1 ; G
e > G; Be > B; if  2 [1;  );
 e1   1 ; Ge  G; Be  B; if  2 [ ;1);
where:
   1 + (1 + 2)AE1
(1 + )R(2  ) 

1 + 
1 + 2
  1


 (el1) 1 2 [1; b ]:
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Figure 3 illustrates the result in Proposition 3. In order to provide the interpretation of
the result in Proposition 3, we focus on the rst-period tax rate because the properties of
government expenditure and debt are qualitatively similar to those of the rst-period tax
rate. After describing the eciency of the rst-period tax rate, we discuss the eciency
of debt issue in relation to the previous studies.
[Figure 3 about here.]
In the current framework, eciency requires the same tax rates between the two peri-
ods in order to smooth the tax burden across periods. However, the political equilibrium
realizes a lower or a higher rst-period tax rate than the ecient one depending on either
the income level of a decisive voter or the degree of capital market imperfection.
To conrm this argument, consider rst the case of a low degree of capital market im-
perfection such that  >  ^: an unconstrained middle-income agent becomes the decisive
voter. He/she prefers a lower rst-period tax rate than the ecient one when his/her
income is high such that em1 > (AE1=R
2)
1
1  ; otherwise, he/she prefers a higher tax
rate. Therefore, the decisive voter's income level aects the eciency of the political-
equilibrium rst-period tax rate when he/she is borrowing unconstrained.
Next, consider the case of a high degree of capital market imperfection such that
 <  ^: the decisive voter is the constrained low-income agent. As demonstrated in
Subsection 3.2, a constrained agent prefers a lower tax rate as the degree of imperfection
is increased. This implies that a further imperfection improves tax smoothing when the
preferred tax rate by the decisive voter is initially higher than the ecient one, while it
prevents tax smoothing when the preferred tax rate is initially lower than the ecient level.
Therefore, the degree of capital market imperfection determines the degree of dierence
from the ecient rate when the decisive voter is borrowing constrained.
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Given the discussion so far, we can now state that the political equilibrium does
not necessarily result in an overissue of public debt in the current framework. Previous
studies, in general, show that the politics results in an overissue of public debt because of
common-pool problems (Tabellini, 1986; Velasco, 1999) and political instability (Persson
and Svensson, 1989; Aghion and Bolton, 1990; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990). In the real
world, however, some countries, such as Australia, Korea and New Zealand, do control
successfully the issue of public debt (OECD, 2009). These countries could be viewed as
issuing public debt below the ecient level. The result of underissue of public debt in the
current framework may provide one possible explanation for these countries.
5 Income Inequality and Borrowing Constraint
The analysis so far has demonstrated the political equilibrium policy given the distribution
of income. This section takes a step toward changing a situation. In particular, we
consider an increase in the initial income of the high type, eh1 , coupled with a decrease
in the initial income of the low type, el1.
3 We focus on the term eE1  APi i(ei1),
which represents the marginal impact of government expenditure on the second-period
GDP. Then, we consider the spread of income distribution, keeping eE1 unchanged. Under
the eE1-preserving spread of income distribution, the second-period tax rate is unchanged
because it is given by 2 = 1 1=
qeE1=R. Thus, the specication enables us to concentrate
on the decisive voter's choice over the rst-period tax 1 and the government debt B.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the rst-period income of the high type, eh1 ; increases and
the rst-period income of the low type, el1, decreases, leaving eE1 unchanged. Then,
there exists a critical level of  ; denoted by e l(> b ), such that the equilibrium debt-
to-GDP ratio decreases if   e l; the equilibrium debt-to-GDP ratio increases if
 > e l.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
The result in Proposition 4 states that the eect of income inequality on the debt-to-
GDP ratio depends heavily on the degree of capital market imperfection, denoted by  .
The spread of income distribution results in a lower debt-to-GDP ratio when the degree
of capital market imperfection is high such that  2 [1; e l]. However, it results in a higher
debt-to-GDP ratio when the degree is low such that  2 ( e l;1). In order to understand
the mechanism behind this result, we present three key results about agents' preferences
3Assuming a decrease in em1 instead of a decrease in e
l
1 does not qualitatively aect the result shown
below.
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being aected by the spread of income distribution. Based on the results, we demonstrate
illustratively the eect of income distribution on the debt-to-GDP ratio.
First, recall the threshold level of capital market imperfection for a type-j agent (j =
l;m), denoted by  j (Proposition 1):
 j  1
2(1 + )
+
AE1
2R(1 + )(2  )(e
j
1)
 1:
The threshold level is increased by the spread of income distribution in the following two
ways. Given  , the spread of income distribution decreases type-l0s labor earnings and,
thus, decreases his/her after-tax income. In addition, a decrease in the type-l0s income
induces him/her to choose a higher rst-period tax rate, which results in a lower after-
tax income for every agent as long as the type-l agent is a decisive voter. Because of
these two negative eects on the after-tax income, the type-j (j = l;m) agent, who is
initially borrowing unconstrained, could become borrowing constrained. This implies that
the range of  that makes the type-j agent (j = l;m) free from borrowing constraint,
( j;1), becomes narrower as the income inequality becomes higher.
Second, the spread of income distribution produces positive and negative eects on
the preferred debt-to-GDP ratio by each agent. The eE1-preserving spread of income
distribution increases the rst-period GDP, E1, implying an expansion of the tax base
in the rst period. This gives the decisive voter an incentive to increase the government
spending and, thus, to issue more public debt. In addition, the type-l agent chooses higher
government spending and, thus, a higher level of public debt when he/she is a decisive
voter because his/her income is decreased by the spread of income distribution. These
are positive eects on the debt-to-GDP ratio. In contrast, an increase in the rst-period
GDP, E1; makes the debt-to-GDP ratio lower for a given B; this is a negative eect.
When the type-j (= l orm) agent is borrowing constrained, the positive eect becomes
smaller than the negative eect because he/she is unable to freely reallocate resources
between the two periods. His/her policy choice results in a lower debt-to-GDP ratio in
response to the spread of income distribution. In contrast, the positive eect overcomes
the negative eect when he/she is borrowing unconstrained.
Third, under Assumption 2, a type-h agent is always borrowing unconstrained and,
thus, prefers a higher B=E1 in response to the spread of income distribution. However,
the preferred level of B=E1 by a type-h agent is always lower than that by the other two
types of agents under Assumption 2. Therefore, the decisive voter is a type-l or type-m
agent who prefers a lower B=E1 between them (Proposition 2).
Based on the above-mentioned three results, we now illustrate changes in preferences
over B=E1 for each type of agent as in Figure 4. The dotted and solid curves in panel (a)
depict the type-j's choices over B=E1 before and after the spread of income distribution,
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respectively. The spread of income distribution increases the threshold level of  that
distinguishes the type of decisive voter from b to b 0. The bold dotted and solid curves
in panel (b) depict the decisive voter's choices over B=E1 before and after the spread of
income distribution, respectively. There exists a unique level of  , denoted by e l 2 ( b ; b 0)
such that the bold dotted and solid curves cross at this level. Therefore, the range of  
is divided into four subranges of  , as illustrated in Figure 4: [1; b ]; ( b ; e l]; ( e l; b 0] and
( b 0;+1):
[Figure 4 about here.]
For  2 [1; b ]; the initial decisive voter is a borrowing-constrained, type-l agent, and
he/she still remains the decisive voter after the spread of income distribution. His/her
choice over policies results in a lower level of B=E1 in response to the decrease in his/her
income. In contrast, for  2 ( b ; e l], the initial decisive voter is a borrowing-unconstrained
type-m agent. Because of the spread of income distribution, the decisive voter changes
from a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent to a borrowing-constrained type-l agent.
The policy choice by the latter results in a lower level of B=E1 than that by the former,
as demonstrated in Figure 4.
For  2 ( e l; b 0], the initial decisive voter is a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent.
The decisive voter changes from a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent to a borrowing-
constrained type-l agent. The policy choice by the latter results in a higher level of B=E1
than that by the former as demonstrated in Figure 4. Finally, for  2 ( b 0;+1); the
initial decisive voter is a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent, and he/she still remains
the decisive voter after the spread of income distribution. His/her choice over policies
results in a higher level of B=E1 in response to the spread of income distribution.
6 Conclusion
This paper developed the two-period, three-class of income model with borrowing con-
straints (i.e., capital market imperfection), and studied the politics of redistributive
expenditure nanced by tax and government debt. In our framework, a borrowing-
unconstrained agent prefers higher government expenditure and debt as his/her rst-
period income becomes lower because he/she wants to compensate his/her income loss
today by redistributive expenditure in the future. However, an opposite result holds for a
borrowing-constrained agent: he/she prefers lower government expenditure and debt be-
cause his/her income becomes lower because he/she is unable to make such compensation
under borrowing constraints.
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We showed the following three results. First, the type of a decisive voter depends
on the degree of capital market imperfection. In particular, the decisive voter becomes
the low-income, borrowing-constrained agent, rather than the middle, when the degree of
capital market imperfection is high. The economy displays the ends-against-the-middle
equilibrium. Second, the political equilibrium generally fails to attain the ecient al-
location. In particular, under a certain condition, the political equilibrium attains an
underissue of government debt when the degree of capital market imperfection is high.
Third, the spread of income distribution results in a lower debt-to-GDP ratio when the
degree of capital market imperfection is high. This is because the decisive voter, who is a
borrowing-constrained, low-income agent, wants to choose lower government expenditure
and debt. The result implies that there is a negative correlation between inequality and
debt-to-GDP ratio when the degree of capital market imperfection is low.
The standard result in the literature of politics and government debt is that (i) the
political economy displays an overissue of government debt, and (ii) the spread of in-
come distribution results in a greater issue of government debt. Our analysis and results,
therefore, show that the standard result does not hold when the borrowing constraint
is considered. More importantly, the result of the negative correlation between inequal-
ity and debt-to-GDP ratio could provide one possible explanation for the cross-country
evidence among OECD countries.
Several research directions for future research are highlighted by our results in this
paper. First, we characterized the structure-induced equilibrium of the voting game where
agents simultaneously vote over tax and government debt. An interesting question is
whether the current result is still true when an alternative concept of equilibrium is
adopted. For example, one may study sequential voting or probabilistic voting. Second,
we assumed a small open economy where the interest rate is exogenous. This simplies
the analysis and guarantees the analytical treatment of our political game but at the cost
of abstracting general equilibrium eects. Third, the default of government debt was not
considered in our analysis. Relaxing these assumptions are interesting areas for future
research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Single-peakedness of Preferences
A.1.1 Single-peakedness of preferences over 1 given 2
Given 2, let ^1(2; e
i
1) denote the rst-period tax rate satisfying
R f(1 + )   1g = (1  2)e
i
2
(1  1)ei1
: (15)
Then, the preferences of a type-i agent over 1 are:
V i(1; 2) =

V iu if 1 < ^1(2; e
i
1);
V ic if 1  ^1(2; ei1);
where V iu and V ic are dened in (13). In what follows, we rst show that both V iu and
V ic are singled peaked over 1. Then, we demonstrate that V
iu = V ic and @V iu=@1 =
@V ic=@1 hold at 1 = ^1(2; e
i
1), implying that V
i has a unique local maximum over the
whole range of 1 and, thus, V
i is single peaked.
In order to show that V iu and V ic are single peaked over 1, we take the rst derivatives
of V iu and V ic with respect to 1, and obtain:
@V iu(1; 2)
@1
R 0,  (1 + )  1
1  1 + (1 + ) 
(1 2)
R
 A(ei1)  E11 22(1 2)
ei1 +
(1 2)
R
 A(ei1)  1E11 22(1 2)
R 0
, (1  2)
R
 A(ei1) 
(1  21)E1
1  2  2(1  2) R e
i
1
, 1  21 R R  f1  
2  2(1  2)g
AE1(1  2)  (e
i
1)
1 
, 1 Q  iu1 (2; ei1) 
1
2
  R  f1  
2  2(1  2)g
2AE1(1  2)  (e
i
1)
1 ; (16)
and
@V ic(1; 2)
@1
R 0,  (1 + )  1
1  1 +  
(1  2)A(ei1)  E11 22(1 2)
(1  2)A(ei1)  1E11 22(1 2) +R(1   )ei1
R 0
, (1  2)A(ei1) 
f   (1 + 2)1gE1
1  22(1  2) R (1 + )R(1   )e
i
1
, 1 Q  ic1 (2; ei1) 

1 + 2
+
(1 + )R(   1)  f1  2  2(1  2)g
(1 + 2)AE1(1  2)  (e
i
1)
1 ;
(17)
where the second lines for both calculations come from the fact that 1 2 2(1 2) > 0:4
These results state that V iu and V ic have a unique local maximum at 1 = 
i
1u(2; e
i
1)
and 1 = 
i
1c(2; e
i
1), respectively, and, thus, are single-peaked.
4The condition 1   2  2(1   2) > 0 always holds because  is set within the range (1; 2) under
Assumption 1, and 2 is set within the range (0; 1=2) under Assumption 1 and the convex costs of
collecting taxes.
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Next, we show that V iu = V ic and @V iu=@1 = @V
ic=@1 hold at 1 = ^1(2; e
i
1). From
(11) and (15), we have:
(1  ^1) = (1  2)
ei1R f(1 + )   1g
 A(ei1) 
^1(1  ^1)E1
1  22(1  2)
, ^1(2; ei1) =
R f(1 + )   1g  f1  22(1  2)g  (ei1)1 
AE1(1  2) : (18)
By direct calculation, we have:
V iu

1=^1(2;ei1)
= V ic

1=^1(2;ei1)
=  log(R) + (1 + )  log( ei1) + (1 + )  log(1  ^1(2; ei1));
@V iu
@1

1=^1(2;ei1)
=
@V ic
@1

1=^1(2;ei1)
=  (1 + )  1
1  ^1(2; ei1)
+
1  2
 R
 A(ei1) 1 
E1
1  2  2(1  2) :
In words, V i is continuous at 1 = ^1(2; e
i
1), and V
iu and V ic have the same slope at
1 = ^1(2; e
i
1). Given these results with the single peakedness of V
iu and V ic, it can
be concluded that V i has a unique local Maximum, as demonstrated in Figure 5. In
particular, V i is maximized at 1 = 
iu
1 (2; e
i
1) if 
iu
1 (2; e
i
1) < ^1(2; e
i
1); it is maximized at
1 = 
ic
1 (2; e
i
1) otherwise.
[Figure 5 about here.]
A.1.2 Single-peakedness of preferences over 2 given 1
Given 1, let ^2(1; e
i
1) denote the second-period tax rate satisfying
R f(1 + )   1g = (1  2)e
i
2
(1  1)ei1
:
From (13), the preferences of a type-i agent over 1 are:
V i(1; 2) =

V iu if 2 > ^2(1; e
i
1);
V ic if 2  ^2(1; ei1):
We take the rst derivatives of V iu and V ic with respect to 2 and obtain:
@V iu(1; 2)
@2
R 0,  1  22(1  2)	+ (1  2)2(1  22) R 0
, 2 Q 1  1

; (19)
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and
@V ic(1; 2)
@2
R 0,  1  22(1  2)	+ (1  2)2(1  22) R 0
, 2 Q 1  1

: (20)
V iu and V ic are maximized at the same tax rate 2 = 1   1=. Thus, we can conclude
that V i has a unique local maximum at 2 = 1  1=; that is, V i is single peaked over 2.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
From (19) and (20), the most preferred second-period tax rate by a type-i agent is given
by:
( i2)
 = 1  1

; (21)
where ( i2)
 2 (0; 1=2) holds under Assumption 1. We substitute 2 = ( i2) into (16) and
(17) and obtain the following most preferred rst-period tax rates by a type-i agent when
he/she is unconstrained and constrained, respectively:
 iu1 
1
2
  R(2  )
2AE1
 (ei1)1 ; (22)
 ic1 

1 + 2
+
(1 + )R(   1)(2  )
(1 + 2)AE1
 (ei1)1 : (23)
Next, we derive (Gi) and (Bi). We substitute (21) and (22) into (11) and (12) to
obtain Giu and Biu :
Giu =
E1
2   

1
2
  R(2  )
2AE1
 (ei1)1 



1
2
+
R(2  )
2AE1
 (ei1)1 

=
E1
4(2  )
"
1 

R(2  )
AE1
2
 (ei1)2(1 )
#
;
Biu = ( i2)
(1  ( i2)) Giu
= (   1) Giu
=
(   1)  E1
4(2  )
"
1 

R(2  )
AE1
2
 (ei1)2(1 )
#
;
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and we substitute (21) and (23) into (11) and (12) to obtain Gic and Bic :
Gic =
E1
2  


1 + 2
+
(1 + )R(   1)(2  )
(1 + 2)AE1
 (ei1)1 



1 + 
1 + 2
  (1 + )R(   1)(2  )
(1 + 2)AE1
 (ei1)1 

=
E1
(2  )(1 + 2)2

(1 + ) +
(1 + )R(   1)(2  )
AE1
 (ei1)1 
 

(1 + )R(   1)(2  )
AE1
2
 (ei1)2(1 )
#
;
Bic = ( i2)
(1  ( i2)) Gic
= (   1) Gic
=
(   1)  E1
(2  )(1 + 2)2

(1 + ) +
(1 + )R(   1)(2  )
AE1
 (ei1)1 
 

(1 + )R(   1)(2  )
AE1
2
 (ei1)2(1 )
#
:
Finally, we substitute  iu1 , (
i
2)
 and Giu into the condition (7) to nd the threshold
level of capital market imperfection for a type-i agent:
 i  1
2(1 + )
+
AE1
2R(1 + )  (2  )  (e
i
1)
 1:

A.3 Voting Over 2 When Preferences Are Characterized by a
Constant Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the second-period tax rate is independent of types and
capital market imperfections under a logarithmic utility function. Here, we show that
the result also holds true as long as the preferences are characterized by a constant in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES). For the purpose of analysis, we consider the
following utility function:
U i =
(ci1)
1 
1   +  
(ci2)
1 
1   ;  6= 1;  > 0;
where  represents the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
In order to solve the problem, suppose that the borrowing constraint is not binding.
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The solution to the utility maximization problem yields:
ciu1 =
1
R + (R)
1



(1  1)ei1 +
(1  2)ei2
R

; (24)
ciu2 =
R(R)
1

R + (R)
1



(1  1)ei1 +
(1  2)ei2
R

; (25)
siu =
R
R + (R)
1


"
(R)
1

R
 (1  1)ei1  
(1  2)ei2
R
#
: (26)
We substitute (26) into the borrowing constraint (3) to obtain the condition where a
type-i agent is actually unconstrained in terms of the tax rates 1 and 2:hn
R + (R)
1

o
   R
i
>
(1  2)ei2
(1  1)ei1
: (27)
This condition states that the borrowing constraint of a type-i agent does not bind when
his/her after-tax income is high in the rst period and is low in the second period. Al-
ternatively, suppose that the borrowing constraint is binding; that is, (27) fails to hold.
The solution to the utility maximization problem is given by (8), (9) and (10).
We substitute the consumption functions and the rst-period government budget con-
straint (11) into the utility function U i, and obtain the following indirect utility function
of a type-i agent:
V i(1; 2) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
V iu 

R
R+(R)
1

1 

n
1 + (R)
1 

o
 1
1 

h
(1  1)ei1 + (1 2)R  A(ei1)  1(1 1)E11 22(1 2)
i1 
+ (const)
if
hn
R + (R)
1

o
   R
i
>
(1 2)ei2
(1 1)ei1
;
V ic  1
1  f (1  1)ei1g
1 
+  R
1  
h
(1   )(1  1)ei1 + (1 2)R  A(ei1)  1(1 1)E11 22(1 2)
i1 
if
hn
R + (R)
1

o
   R
i
 (1 2)ei2
(1 1)ei1
:
(28)
We take the rst derivative of V iu and V ic with respect to 2 and obtain:
@V iu(1; 2)
@2
R 0, @
@2

(1  2)
1  2  2(1  2)

R 0
, 2 Q 1  1

;
and
@V ic(1; 2)
@2
R 0, @
@2

(1  2)
1  2  2(1  2)

R 0
, 2 Q 1  1

.
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The result implies that voter's preferences over 2 are unaected by types and capital
market imperfections as long as the utility function is characterized by CIES.
The intuition behind the result is as follows. An agent chooses 2 to maximize his/her
second-period after-tax income given by:
(1  2)ei2 = (1  2)  A(ei1) G
= (1  2)  A(ei1) 
1(1  1)E1
1  2  2(1  2) ;
regardless of whether he/she is borrowing constrained or not; and whether his/her utility
function is characterized by a logarithmic function or CIES. The rst line comes from the
assumption of ei2 = A(e
i
1)
  G; and the second line comes from the government budget
constraints (1) and (2). Thus, maximizing (1   2)ei2 with respect to 2 is equivalent to
maximizing (1  2)= f1  2  2(1  2)g that is independent of types and capital market
imperfections.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1
(i) The dierentiation of  ic1 with respect to  leads to:
@ ic
@ 
=
(1 + )R(2  )
(1 + 2)AE1
> 0.
Next, we dierentiate Gic with respect to  and derive the condition for which
@Gic=@ > 0 holds:
@Gic
@ 
> 0 , (1 + )R(2  )
AE1
 (ei1)1 
  2  (1 + )R(   1)(2  )
AE1
 (1 + )R(2  )
AE1
 (ei1)2(1 ) > 0
, 1  2  (1 + )R(   1)(2  )
AE1
 (ei1)1  > 0
,  < 1 + AE1
2R(1 + )(2  )  (e
i
1)
 1: (29)
Based on the result in Proposition 1, the following condition holds when a type-i agent
is borrowing constrained:
 <  i  1
2(1 + )
+
AE1
2R(1 + )(2  )  (e
i
1)
 1:
Because the right-hand side of (29) is greater than  i, we obtain:
 <  i < 1 +
AE1
2R(1 + )(2  )  (e
i
1)
 1;
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implying that @Gic=@ > 0 actually holds. Finally, given Bic = ( 1) Gic, @Bic=@ > 0
also holds in equilibrium.
(ii) From the result in Proposition 1, we obtain:
 ic1

 = i
=

1 + 2
+
(1 + )R(2  )
(1 + 2)AE1


  1 + 2
2(1 + )
+
AE1
2R(1 + )(2  )  (e
i
1)
 1

 (ei1)1 
=

1 + 2
  R(2  )
2AE1
 (ei1)1  +
1
2(1 + 2)
=
1
2
  R(2  )
2AE1
 (ei1)1 
=  iu1 : (30)
From (11), we also obtain:
Giu = Gic , 
iu
1 (1   iu1 )E1
2   =
 ic1 (1   ic1 )E1
2  
,  iu1 =  ic1 ;
which implies
 =  i:
Finally, we obtain:
Bic

 = i
= (   1) Gic
 = i
= (   1) Giu
= Biu:

A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider rst the political determination of the second-period tax rate. As demonstrated
in Proposition 1, all agents choose the same second-period tax rate, given by  2 = 1 1=.
This is the equilibrium tax rate in majority voting.
Next, consider the political determination of the rst-period tax rate. As demonstrated
in Proposition 1, the preferred tax rate by a type-i agent, ( i1)
, is:
( i1)
 =

 ic1 for    i;
 iu1 for  >  
i:
Under Assumption 2, the critical degrees of the three types of agents,  l;  m; and  h are
ordered as:
 h < 1 <  m <  l.
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Given this order, a type-h agent is borrowing unconstrained and chooses (h1 )
 = hu1 8 2
[1;1). In contrast, a type-i (i = l;m) agent is borrowing constrained and chooses ( i1) =
 ic1 for    i; he/she is borrowing unconstrained and chooses ( i1) =  iu1 for  >  i.
Preferred rst-period tax rates by the three types of agents are illustrated in Panel
(a) of Figure 2. Because ( l1)
 < (m1 )
 holds for  2 [1;  l] and ( l1) > (m1 ) holds for
 2 [ m;1), there exists a critical degree of  , denoted by  ^, such that ( l1) = (m1 )
holds. We solve ( l1)
 = (m1 )
 for  and obtain the following critical degree that changes
the order of preferred rst-period tax rates by types l and m agents:
b = AE1 +R(2  )  2(1 + )  (el1)1    (1 + 2)  (em1 )1 
2(1 + )R(2  )  (el1)1 
2 ( m;  l):
Given the denition of  i and b , we now divide the range of  into the following four
subranges: [1;  m); [ m; b ); [ b ;  l); and [ l;1). As illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 2,
preferred tax rates by the three types of agents and their order are:8>><>>:
(h1 )
 = hu1 < (
l
1)
 =  lc1 < (
m
1 )
 = mc1 for  2 [1;  m]
(h1 )
 = hu1 < (
l
1)
 =  lc1 < (
m
1 )
 = mu1 for  2 ( m; b ]
(h1 )
 = hu1 < (
m
1 )
 = mu1 < (
l
1)
 =  lc1 for  2 ( b ;  l]
(h1 )
 = hu1 < (
m
1 )
 = mu1 < (
l
1)
 =  lu1 for  2 ( l;1):
Under the assumption of distribution of three types of agents, a type ranked in the
middle of preferred tax rates becomes the decisive voter. That is, the decisive voter is a
borrowing-constrained type-l agent for  2 [1; b ); it is a borrowing-unconstrained type-m
agent for  2 [ b ;1). Thus, the equilibrium tax rate determined in majority voting is:
(1)
 =
(
 lc1 for  2 [1; b ]
mu1 for  2 ( b ;1):
The corresponding levels of G and B are:
G =
(
Glc for  2 [1; b ]
Gmu for  2 ( b ;1)
B =
(
Blc for  2 [1; b ]
Bmu for  2 ( b ;1):
These are calculated based on the result in Proposition 1.

A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
As demonstrated in Proposition 2,  1 is equal to 
lc
1 and is increasing in  for  2 [1;  ^);
 1 is equal to 
mu
1 and is constant for  2 [ ^;1). That is,  1 attains the lowest value
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=(1 + 2) at  = 1 and the highest value at  2 [ ^;1). Thus,  e1 >  1 holds 8  1 if
 e1 > 
mu
1 ; and 
e
1 < 

1 holds 8  1 if  e1 < =(1 + 2). That is,
 e1 > 

1 8  1 if em1 >

AE1
R2
 1
1 
;
 e1 < 

1 8  1 if  <
1 + 2
1 + 
:
Suppose that the above-mentioned two conditions fail to hold; that is, em1  (AE1=R2)
1
1 
and   (1 + 2)=(1 + ) hold. Because of the continuity of  lc1 with respect to  , there
exists a critical level of  , denoted by  , such that  e1 = 
lc
1 holds. Solving 
e
1 = 
lc
1 for
 leads to:
 =    1 + (1 + 2)AE1
(1 + )R(2  )

1 + 
1 + 2
  1


 (el1) 1:
Thus, we obtain  e1 R  1 if  Q  .
The same argument holds for G and B because they have the same property as  1
with respect to  , as demonstrated in Proposition 2.

A.7 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider an increase in the initial income of the high type, eh1 , coupled with a decrease
in the initial income of the type-l, keeping eE1 unchanged. Given the denition of eE1 
A
P
i 
i(ei1)
, the eE1-preserving spread of income distribution results in:
d eE1 = 0, deh1 = ( 1) lh  (eh1)1 (el1)1   del1: (31)
Under this spread of income distribution, the rst-period GDP, given by E1 =
P
i 
iei1,
changes as follows:
dE1 = 
l  del1 + h  deh1
=

1  (e
h
1)
1 
(el1)
1 

 l  del1
> 0: (32)
where the equality in the second line comes from (31).
By the use of the result in (32), we hereafter investigate how the type-j0s (j = l;m; h)
preference over B=E1 changes in response to the eE1-preserving spread of income dis-
tribution. We rst consider borrowing-unconstrained and borrowing-constrained cases
separately. Then, we unify the two cases to determine the decisive voter for each level of
28
 before and after the eE1-preserving spread of income distribution, and demonstrate the
eect of this distribution spread on the decisive voter's choice over B=E1.
Under Assumption 2, a type-h agent is always borrowing unconstrained. The preferred
level of B=E1 by a type-h agent is always lower than that by the other two types of agents,
under Assumption 2. The decisive voter is a type-l or type-m agent who prefers a lower
B=E1(Proposition 1) between them. Therefore, we hereafter focus on types-l and m
agents.
A.7.1 An unconstrained type-j's (j = l;m) preference over B=E1
We consider how the type-j's (j = l;m) preference over B=E1 is aected by the eE1-
preserving spread of income distribution when he/she is borrowing unconstrained. From
(14) in Proposition 1, the preferred debt-to-GDP ratio by an unconstrained type-j's in-
dividual is given by:
Bju
E1
=
   1
4(2  ) 
"
1 

R(2  )
AE1
2
 (ej1)2(1 )
#
; j = l; m:
Dierentiation of the above equation with respect to Bju=E1; E1 and e
j
1 leads to:
4(2  )
   1  d

Bju
E1

= 2

R(2  )
A
2


1
E1
3
 (ej1)2(1 )  dE1
  2(1  ) 

R(2  )
AE1
2
 (ej1)1 2  dej1
= 2

R(2  )
AE1
2
 (ej1)1 2 
(
ej1
E1
 dE1   (1  )  dej1
)
: (33)
(33) indicates that d
 
Blu=E1

> 0 always holds because dE1 > 0 as shown in (32) and
dej1  0 (j = l, m), under the current assumption.
A.7.2 A constrained type-j's (j = l;m) preference over B=E1
Next, we consider how the type-j's (j = l;m) preference over B=E1 is aected by theeE1-preserving spread of income distribution when he/she is borrowing constrained. From
(14) in Proposition 1, the preferred debt-to-GDP ratio by a constrained type-j's individual
is given by:
Bjc
E1
=
   1
(2  )(1 + 2)2
"
(1 + ) +   
(
(ej1)
1 
E1
     (e
j
1)
2(1 )
(E1)2
)#
; j = l; m; (34)
where
   (1 + )R(   1)(2  )
A
:
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Dierentiation of the above equation with respect to Bjc=E1; E1 and e
j
1 leads to:
(2  )(1 + 2)2
   1  d

Bjc
E1

=   

1  
E1
(ej1)
       2(1  )
(E1)2
 (ej1)1 2

 dej1
+   
(
 (e
j
1)
1 
(E1)2
+ 2   (e
j
1)
2(1 )
(E1)3
)
 dE1
=
(1  ) (ej1) 
E1

(
1  2 (e
j
1)
1 
E1
)
 dej1
   (e
j
1)
1 
(E1)2

(
1  2 (e
j
1)
1 
E1
)
 dE1
=
 (ej1)
 
E1

(
1  2 (e
j
1)
1 
E1
)

"
(1  )  dej1  
ej1
E1
 dE1
#
;
(35)
where the sign of the term

1  2 (ej1)1 =E1
	
in the last line is positive under the as-
sumption that the type-j agent is borrowing constrained.5 (35) indicates that d
 
Blc=E1

>
0 always holds because dE1 > 0 as shown in (32) and de
j
1  0 (j = l; m), under the current
assumption.
A.7.3 Decisive voter's choice over B=E1
Based on the results established so far, we can illustrate changes in preferences over B=E1
by three types of agents, as in Figure 4.
The bold dotted and solid curves depict the decisive voter's choices over B=E1 before
and after the spread of income distribution, respectively. The spread of income distri-
bution increases the threshold level of  that distinguishes the type of a decisive voter,
5The parameter  included in   satisfy    j because we assume that the type-j agent (j = l;m) is
now borrowing constrained (Proposition 1). By the use of the denition of  j in Proposition 1, we can
write:
1  2 (e
j
1)
1 
E1
= 1  2(1 + )R(   1)(2  )  (e
j
1)
1 
AE1
 1  2(1 + )R( 
j   1)(2  )  (ej1)1 
AE1
= 1  2(1 + )R(2  )  (e
j
1)
1 
AE1
 AE1   (1 + 2)R(2  )  (e
j
1)
1 
2(1 + )R(2  )  (ej1)1 
= 1  AE1   (1 + 2)R(2  )  (e
j
1)
1 
AE1
=
(1 + 2)R(2  )  (ej1)1 
AE1
> 0;
where the inequality in the second line comes from    j , and the inequality in the last line comes from
Assumption 1.
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denoted by  ^, from b to b 0. There exists a unique level of  , denoted by e l 2 ( b ; b 0)
such that the bold dotted and solid curves cross at this level. Therefore, there are four
subranges of  , as illustrated in Figure 4: [1; b ]; ( b ; e l]; ( e l; b 0] and ( b 0;+1):
For  2 [1; b ]; the initial decisive voter is a borrowing-constrained, type-l agent, and
he/she still remains the decisive voter after the spread of income distribution. His/her
choice over policies results in a lower level of B=E1 in response to the spread of income
distribution, as demonstrated in Subsection A.7.2. Thus, the eE1-preserving spread of
income distribution leads to a lower level of B=E1.
For  2 ( b ; e l], the initial decisive voter is a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent.
Because of the spread of income distribution, the decisive voter changes from a borrowing-
unconstrained type-m agent to a borrowing-constrained type-l agent. The policy choice
by the latter results in a lower level of B=E1 than that by the former, as demonstrated
in Figure 4.
For  2 ( e l; b 0], the initial decisive voter is a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent.
The decisive voter changes from a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent to a borrowing-
unconstrained type-l agent. The policy choice by the latter results in a higher level of
B=E1 than that by the former, as demonstrated in Figure 4.
Finally, for  2 ( b 0;+1); the initial decisive voter is a borrowing-unconstrained type-
m agent, and he/she still remains the decisive voter after the spread of income distribution.
His/her choice over policies results in a higher level of B=E1 in response to the spread
of income distribution, as shown in Subsection A.7.1. Thus, the eE1-preserving spread of
income distribution leads to a higher level of B=E1.

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Figure 1: The most preferred policies for a type-i agent.
35
Figure 2: The bold curves show equilibrium policies.
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Figure 3: Panel (a) is the case of em1 >

AE1
R2
 1
1 
; panel (b) is the case of  < 1+2
1+
; and
panel (c) is the case of em1 

AE1
R2
 1
1 
and   1+2
1+
.
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Figure 4: In panel (a), the dotted and solid curves depict the choice of a type-j(= l;m)
agent over B=E1 before and after the spread of income distribution, respectively. In panel
(b), the bold dotted and solid curves depict the choice of the decisive voter over B=E1
before and after the spread of income distribution, respectively.
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Figure 5: The bold curve illustrates the type-i's indirect utility as a function of 1 given
2. The gure is the case of 
iu
1 (2; e
i
1) < b1(2; ei1).
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